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Abstract
This paper carries out a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of informal
institutions in facilitating intergenerational contracts governing investments in schooling
and payments of pensions in the form of remittances. We show, using detailed household-
level data from rural Tanzania, that informal institutions of social control, rooted in tribal
a¢ liations, determine both the households investment in schooling and the probability
that it receives remittances from migrants. This is consistent with a framework in which
householdsexpected returns in the form of remittances, which is determined partly by the
prospects of social control over migrants, inuence current investments in schooling.
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1 Introduction
Investment in human capital in the form of schooling is one of the primary ingredients of
economic growth. In all developed countries, basic schooling is provided for free or at low cost
by the state, but both historically and in contemporary less developed economies, the most
common form of investment in human capital is parental, or family, investment in schooling on
behalf of children. Unlike other types of investments or saving instruments, however, investing
in children is characterized by a fundamental problem of intergenerational contracting: parents
cannot make a legal claim for return on, or even repayment of, the investment. In some cases,
this inability can make parents choose less schooling (Ben-Porath, 1967) and instead rely on
other modes of savings.
The basic problem is that children are not allowed to enter contractual agreements such
as promising to provide for their parents in exchange for schooling investments made by the
parents on behalf of their children. Becker and Murphy (1988) and Thompson and Ruhter
(1979) argue that a possible response to this time inconsistency problem is for the state to
provide schooling to young people and, at the same time, enforce old-age pensions such that the
working population, when making investments in schooling, would be entitled to a share of the
returns in the form of pensions paid out when they are old. This political equilibrium, denoted
a social compact by Becker and Murphy (1988, p. 9), separates the individual investment from
the individual return and makes enforcement a non-issue as both schooling and taxation is made
compulsory by the state.1 Recent analyses by Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2005)
provide a formal analysis of the Becker-Murphy argument, the latter focusing specically on
education and pensions, the former providing a general analysis of self-sustaining agreements
over intergenerational goods.
Such intertemporal social compacts require a state su¢ ciently strong that it can credibly
both raise taxes for (future) pensions and provide adequate schooling for children. However, a
dening feature of less developed economies is that the provision of many services takes place
through informal institutional arrangements, rather than the formal institutions embodied in
developed economies. What happens when the state is not that strong? The result may be
autarchy (Thompson and Ruhter, 1979) in which childrens human capital is not used for
savings at all, or under some circumstances, the result may be self-enforcing family equilibria
based on tit-for-tat type strategies by children towards defecting adult children (Ehrlich and
Lui, 1991; Cigno, 1993; Rangel, 2003). Becker and Tomes (1985) and Becker and Murphy
(1988), and many with them, point to the existence of social norms that can pressure children
1Given that all other children are educated and parents will receive old-age support from the state, a free-
riding problem emerges since parents could be tempted to have their own children working. See Thompson and
Ruhter (1979) for a complete framework that includes also compulsory schooling and child labor laws as well as
school leaving laws, and Goldin and Parsons (1989) for evidence from the U.S. in the 19th century.
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to support parents in exchange for investments in schooling done by the parents or extended
family on behalf of the children, paving the way for investments to be made in the rst place,
an impression strongly supported by our eld data from Tanzania; for example, one respondent
recalled a story where
In a neighboring village the father was neglected by the well-paid son that was
living in the distant city Dar [es Salaam]. The father arranged a trip to go to him,
but he was still betrayed. While he was in Dar, the father got assistance from others
and visited the sons employer and he was granted a monthly lump sum that was
deducted from the sons salary.[C13, Q8, translated].2
The case where the social compact is not enforced by the state is important, both historically
and in the contemporary developing world, and the role of social norms and, more generally,
informal institutions and the larger civil society in enforcing the intergenerational contract is,
while frequently referred to, to our knowledge largely unexplored.3 In this paper, we provide
a theoretical framework for and an empirical investigation of the relationship between the
informal social setting and the fulllment of the intergenerational contract.
The key idea of our paper is simple: Parents invest in schooling for their children, partly
with the aim of receiving a return on their investment. The expected return on the investment
depends on the probability of receiving remittances from migrant children. If remittances are
not paid, the child faces social sanctions from violating the norm of repayment. Such sanctions
are more likely to be carried out in villages characterized by strong informal institutions. Thus,
strong informal institutions increase the probability of receiving remittances, which increases
the expected return on education. This, in turn, increases current investment in schooling.
To measure the strength of informal institutions, we start from the recent conceptualization
of social capital. While social capital has come to mean many di¤erent things and is opera-
tionalized in many di¤erent ways, we follow Coleman (1988, 1990) in seeing social capital as
di¤erent entities that all consist of some aspect of social structures, and [...] facilitate certain
actions of actors [...] within the structure. (Coleman, 1988, S98). As noted by Bates (1999,
2000), ethnicity is one such structure. Ethnic or tribal a¢ liation, like kinship, carries with it
promises and obligations and provides, through traditions and social norms, what Coleman
calls a structure.
To operationalize the role of ethnicity in informal institutions, we use a tribal fragmenta-
tion index to capture the degree of population heterogeneity along tribal lines at the village
2Cluster 13, item 8, translated from notes in Swahili, as are following quotes.
3For example, The Department for Economic and Social A¤airs of the United Nations note in their 2005
Annual Report on the social situation of the world [t]he manner in which the intergenerational contract is
currently honoured varies across societies. In most developing countries, intergenerational support is sustained
within a wide kinship network and sometimes through community interaction, while in developed countries the
State mediates and/or supports the contract to varying degrees.(UN 2005, p. 82)
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level. There is considerable evidence that such heterogeneity is associated with less success
in overcoming collective action problems and providing public goods (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005). In our setting of sub-Saharan Africa, this is an appropriate measure of informal in-
stitution strength, as insurance and the provision of services with a public element typically
are organized through informal institutions grounded in kinship or tribal associations rather
than in the weak or developing state. Based on this, we make one key assumption: informal
institutions guiding and enforcing the set of social norms governing intergenerational exchange
function better when a village is characterized by a higher degree of tribal homogeneity. This
assumption, discussed in detail below, is widely supported in experimental and empirical work
on the role of identity in overcoming collective action problems.
We investigate the e¤ect of village level tribal fragmentation on schooling and remittances
using two di¤erent data sets from Tanzania, both collected in the early 1990s. One covers the
entire of Tanzania, another, with very detailed data on migrants and remittances, covers the
Kagera region, a rural region by Lake Victoria in the Northwestern part of the country. We nd
that village level tribal homogeneity is associated with both more schooling and, conditional
on schooling, a higher probability of receiving remittances from relatives living elsewhere. This
is consistent with the idea that informal institutions facilitate honouring the intergenerational
contract. Households living in villages with a higher degree of tribal fractionalization choose less
schooling for the children of the household, controlling for a wide range of household, school,
and village characteristics. This is the case in both data sets. In our preferred specication
on the Tanzania-wide data set, increasing tribal fractionalization by one standard deviation
decreases the probability of a child being in school by approximately six percentage points.
In our preferred specication on the Kagera data, increasing tribal fractionalization from its
minimum to its maximum level decreases the probability of observing remittances in the past
six months by eight percentage points.
We identify the e¤ect of tribal fractionalization on investment in schooling and remittances
by examining the potential endogeneity of the tribal composition of villages, the possibili-
ties of spurious e¤ects, which could arise if tribal fractionalization is correlated with other
between-village di¤erences, and the selectivity of youngsters migrating to di¤erent places. Eth-
nic land settlement in East Africa is largely determined by stable historical patterns (Miguel
and Gugerty, 2005; Miguel, 2004) and we show that residential mobility in and out of the
villages in our sample is very limited and unrelated to tribal fractionalization and school char-
acteristics, and that results are independent of mobility issues. Further, we compare a wide
range of socioeconomic, demographic, and school quality variables across homogenous and di-
verse villages, both for the entire distribution of tribal fractionalization and for villages in the
lowest and highest quintile of fractionalization, respectively, and nd tribal fractionalization to
be orthorgonal to all potentially confounding variables. Finally, we compare migrants residing
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in similar environments to each other, rather than migrants in the major cities with migrants
in nearby villages.
We examine several possible, and possibly coexisting, explanations for the nding that tribal
fractionalization is associated with less schooling. To discriminate among these, which include
the role of urban networks, credit constraints, land availability and school characteristics, we
rely on several additional sources of data. In addition to the Tanzania-wide data set, we
use supplementary data on social capital and inequality available for a subset of the sampled
households. As a supplement to the detailed Kagera region data, in order to learn more about
the causal path from tribal fractionalization to schooling and remittance, we use our own data
from group interviews in Kagera villages, collected partly for this reason. Finally, we rely
on the large anthropological and economic literature on tribes and kinship, and migration,
respectively.
The paper links with several entwined strands of literature. As noted above, a number of
papers examine implicit intergenerational contracts. Thompson and Ruhter (1979), Parsons
(1984), Becker and Murphy (1988), and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) all consider some variant of the
intrafamily intergenerational contract. Thompson and Ruhter (1979) and Becker and Murphy
(1988) focus on the role of the state in facilitating intergenerational contracts in the absence of
binding contracts with children, Parsons (1984) analyzes intergenerational transfers within the
economic framework of the family, and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) consider self-enforcing agree-
ments in an overlapping generations framework, though with a focus on fertility. Two recent
papers, Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2005) provide the game-theoretic foundations
for the discussion in Becker and Murphy (1988). Rangel analyzes the general case of (as he
calls them) forward and backward intergenerational goods, while Boldrin and Montes provide
a focused analysis of the role of the state in providing both education and pensions. We know
of only one paper that explicitly links tribal a¢ liation to the obligations to remit: Based on
eld work in the Luapula province in Zambia (Bates, 1976), Bates (2000) argues that ethnicity
empowers the elders with political control over land rights that are of crucial importance for
migrants wishing to return, but he does not consider the investment motive in education.
Second, the paper contributes to what is sometimes called the new economics of labor
migration (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark, 1991; Lucas, 1997), by explicitly linking migration
behavior and the decision to remit with schooling decisions. Lucas (1997, p. 750), summarizing
the large literature on internal labor migration in developing countries, concludes that it
seems plausible that education is part of an intertemporal arrangement; the family educates
members in order for them to migrate and gain urban entry, ultimately to repay the family
from town.4 As noted by Lucas, however, a di¢ culty with such an intertemporal arrangement
4A large literature has investigated the various motives for remittances. Cox and Rank (1992) nd support
for the exchange motive, Lee, Parish, and Willis (1994), and Lillard and Willis (1997, 2002) nd support for the
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is enforcement; however, to some extent, trust, tradition and altruism make the family a
natural enforcement unit. While the economic literature on migration and education has
rarely looked beyond the household, Lucas (1997) notes that a third level of factors, denoted
contextual e¤ects in the demography literature (e.g. Hugo, 1981; Findley, 1987; Bilsborrow et
al. 1987), comprises the inuence and composition of the sending community upon migration
decisions. Such contextual e¤ects remain largely unexplored in both theoretical and empirical
economics studies of migration-related issues, though some work has been done mainly in the
context of migration networks (Winters et al. 2001) and on the role of relative deprivation as a
cause of migration (Stark, 1991). This paper looks at how context informal institutions and,
to a lesser extent, social capital a¤ects education and remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985)
show that the prospects for inheritance matter: for example, sons of families with larger herds
remit more, as families have a better bargaining position in this case. In our empirical work,
we also control for institutions governing inheritance when estimating the e¤ect of informal
institutions on remittances.5
Third, as ethnicity is part of the broader concept of social capital, the paper contributes,
from a developing country perspective, to the mainly U.S.-centered literature on the e¤ects of
social capital on schooling decisions. Coleman (1988, 1990), who shares credit for introducing
the term social capital,examined the role of social networks (or fabric) in lowering the risk of
high school dropout, and Goldin and Katz (1999) argue that the expansion of higher secondary
education in the United States before WWII was inuenced to a considerable extent by social
capital. They measure social capital by the resources allocated by local communities to primary
schooling. As such, they consider only one part of the intergenerational contract, as do Miguel
and Gugerty (2005) in their careful analysis of how ethnic diversity hinders voluntary school
nancing in Kenya.
Finally, the paper contributes, though from a di¤erent angle, to the literature on the e¤ects
of ethnic diversity on public policy outcomes.6 Easterly and Levine (1997) note, examining a
cross-section of countries, that economic growth is negatively related to the degree of ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) nd that less funds are allocated to
local public goods provision in more racially diverse municipalities in the U.S., and Miguel and
Gugerty (2005) argue that it is the relative inability to impose sanctions across ethnic groups
repayment of implicit loan-hypothesis in South-East Asia, while Raut and Tran (2005) reject the loan motive in
favor of a reciprocity motive. Cox and Fafchamps (2008) provide a recent survey.
5Collier and Gunning (1999, p.78-9) notes on the African experience that [l]ineage rules of inheritance en-
forced intergeneration transfer payments. The kin group was able to enforce adherence to each particular rule
through the threat of exclusion from the entire package of benets. Bates (1999, 2000) provides a general
overview; see for example Snyder (1997) for specic evidence on the Iraqw of northern Tanzania, and Gul-
liver (1971) for an in-depth study of how kinship and tribal a¢ liation shaped interaction in Tanzania before
independence.
6A separate literature has considered the e¤ects of ethnic diversity on the risk of conict and internal warfare.
Bates (1999) provides an introduction to both topics.
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that can hinder cooperation and voluntary contributions to local public goods, illustrating
their point by a careful analysis of primary school funding in rural Kenya. While the existing
literature has examined the e¤ect of ethnic diversity on cooperative or public outcomes, such
as public goods provision, we consider the e¤ects of fractionalization on a seemingly private
decision: Investment in childrens schooling.
The next section introduces the Tanzanian setting, including impressions from our group
discussions, and section three sets up a simple model for how tribal fractionalization inuences
household decisions on schooling through its e¤ects on the e¢ cacy of social sanctions. Section
four presents the data, and section ve considers empirical issues related to analysis, including
identication. Section six reports results and section seven examines alternative explanations.
Section eight concludes.
2 Schooling and pensions in Tanzania: The setting
2.1 Education and Pensions in Tanzania
In the 1970s, under then-President Nyereres Education for Self-Reliance program, o¢ cial es-
timates put gross school enrolment rates for 7-13 olds at 95 %. By 1993, following years of
economic decline, the o¢ cial estimate was 70 %, well above our estimate of 55 %, based on
data from rural areas only.7 Compulsory schooling was re-introduced in 2001 by then-President
Mkapa, and free primary schooling, funded mainly by donor agencies, has boosted enrolment
rates; some concerns persist, however, about the quality of primary education.8 The rst
wide-spread funded pension system was introduced in 1997 as part of a comprehensive social
insurance legislation, but pension payments remain low and most people are reliant on the
family in old-age and in case of economic hardship.
2.2 Impressions from group discussions
Our empirical observation that tribal fractionalization, through informal institutions and so-
cial norms, a¤ects schooling can, as noted above, have many di¤erent explanations. To help us
identify potential alternative explanations for the observed association between tribal fraction-
alization and schooling, to distinguish among hypotheses that are observationally equivalent in
the reduced form econometric work and, if possible, to assist us in evaluating the relative merit
of these hypotheses, we conducted a series of group discussions and semi-structured interviews
in twelve KHDS villages in the Kagera District in Northwestern Tanzania in 2005, working
7See Buchert (1994) on the education in Tanzania. Numbers are from Gibbon and Raikes (1995).
8Milton Nkosi: Tanzania looks beyond free schooling.BBC News Africa, July 15, 2005.
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with the team that collected a new round of KHDS data in 2004.9
The quantitative data employed in the empirical analysis dates back to the early 1990s,
while the group discussions were conducted in 2005. The main change in the intervening
period is the re-introduction of compulsory schooling noted above, and all groups invariably
stated that primary schooling has become common for everyone, which was not the case before.
Respondents also argued that this to some extent also has diminished the value of primary
schooling, and increased the need for secondary schooling.
When asked to discuss the value of schooling, a standard reply was that schooling is for
the benet and development of the child, but a frequent additional explanation was often
given: one man argued that if you sow maize, you dont only want to look at the ower,
you also want to harvest [Cluster 19, item 2]. Generally, (primary) schooling is seen as a
better investment than giving the child land, as it is better to give education than to give a
shamba, with education a child can buy himself many shambas.[Cluster 4, item 2]. A major
motivation for schooling is to make the child self-reliant and thus no longer a nancial burden
to the parents, but there was also a clear expectation in the villages that formal education, in
particular secondary schooling, leads to migration and, not least, remittances. When asked to
rank proles of children with di¤erent educational levels, less educated children and children
staying nearby were expected to help with household chores (washing clothes, eld work) while
educated children, in particular those with secondary schooling, were expected to remit cash.
In general, (older) boys would receive priority in schooling investments, as girls by Tan-
zanian custom become part of their husbands family, and returns on education, as a result,
will not accrue to the household; there was some disagreement about the latter point, though.
In particular, girls were portrayed as more caring for their family, and examples were given of
daughters favouring their parents over her husbands parents. At the same time, pregnancy
was often mentioned as a reason both for girls dropping out of school and, as a result thereof,
9Documentation is found in Lassen and Lilleør (2008). Discussions were carried out in twelve villages,
selected among the KHDS villages to achieve a balance between high and low fractionalization villages. We did
two rounds of pre-testing of the focus group discussion (FGD) questionnaire, one in a high TF village and one
in a low TF village, with subsequent adjustments to the questionnaire. The nal questionnaire (available in
Lassen and Lilleør, 2008) is a mixture of open-ended and exploratory questions, group assessments of likelihoods
(e.g. for migrating and remitting for types of children), and closed form factual questions. In addition to the
questionnaire, a roster of participants was taken as they arrived. We also set up procedures for reporting of the
results so as to ensure a uniform reporting across villages
A typical session had a duration of three and a half hours including a break and included approximately ten
villagers with some knowledge of schooling, comprising all adult age groups and both men and women, selected
in cooperation with the village leader (an elected local) and the village executive o¢ cer (appointed by the central
government, not local). In high TF villages selection was done so as to have members from more than one tribe
present in the FGD (in Kagera, one tribe villages almost always means Haya villages, and the Hayas are often
the majority tribe in more mixed villages as well; see Reining, 1967, for an in-depth study of the Haya.) All
sessions were conducted with the same facilitator and the same note taker. Following each session, a subjective
evaluation of the degree of overall participation, the degree of equal participation and the degree of knowledge
of the participants was carried out.
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for not investing in secondary schooling for girls in the rst place.
According to the participants of the group discussions, the degree of sanctions or measures
(as they were invariably called by respondents) which can be taken against children failing to
remit or help out as they are expected to varies considerably. Sanctions range from having the
clan reprimand the non-remitting child [e.g. cluster 2, item 8] over imposing nes, or cursing
children, to reducing the amount or the quality of land to be inherited. The most serious,
and most common, sanction is to deny non-remitting children inheritance in the form of land,
including access to burial grounds. In one group discussion, a respondent provided an example
of a parent selling o¤ his land when his children in Dar Es Salaam did not send remittances; as
a result, the children began remitting [cluster 23, item 8]. Is such a threat credible, given that
major inheritance decisions are taken after the parentsdeaths? Respondents in one village
agreed with the statement by one man that the community may [...] intervene if the father
can say it before his death [cluster 4, item 8 and eld notes]. When asked whether it would
make a di¤erence if a non-remitting child comes from a good cooperation village (associated
by respondents primarily with homogeneous villages) as opposed to a poor cooperation village
(associated with heterogeneous villages), the general response was that children from good
cooperation villages should expect stronger measures: those from villages with good cooper-
ation will get stronger measures, because it is easy for the members to sit and discuss on the
measures to be taken, while it is di¢ cult for the village without good cooperation because it
is di¢ cult to reach the consensus. [cluster 8, item 8]. In another village, respondents stated
that all the measures depend on how the parent decides with blessings of the clan, in case
they belong to the strong one [cluster 7, item 8]. These statements support the notion that
social sanctions can indeed be used as an enforcement tool by parents, especially with the help
of their fellow clan/tribe members, and that this is likely to be more pronounced in tribally
homogenous villages.
3 Schooling, remittances, and informal institutions
Our approach is to follow the literature on the economics of labor migration in looking at
household, or broader family, strategies in devising implicit intertemporal agreements that
govern the allocation of resources towards investment in education, and the link to migration
and payment of remittances to the household when the migrant begins earning money in
town.10 We begin from a standard model of educational choice (e.g. Baland and Robinson,
10Thus, we focus on one particular set of strategies within a broader set of possible family strategies. Lucas
(1997) provides an overview of studies linking migration with fertility, marriage, and risk spreading, issues we do
not consider here. Regarding fertility, we nd below that household sizes across homogenous and heterogenous
villages are essentially identical, suggesting that it is not fertility as an omitted variable that is the cause of our
ndings.
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2000) without any altruism. Parents make a choice between child labor and schooling in the
rst period, when the child is a part of the household. In our model, formal education in the
form of schooling increases the probability of getting a high wage job in the urban sector. In the
second period, the child, now called the migrant, enjoys consumption on its own and can choose
whether or not to remit a share of its labor income to the household, which makes economic
decisions in the second period. As noted by Lucas and Stark (1985), when remittances are not
based on altruism alone, or at all, enforcement of the implicit intertemporal contract becomes
a key issue. This enforcement is provided through the family, the tribe and the urban network
(Ben-Porath, 1985) by appealing to norms, traditions and trust as well as to promises for
inheritance, possibilities of land allocations upon returning to their rural home, and access to
burial grounds.
In the model, the impact of informal institutions on remittersbehavior is thus based on
two key assumptions: First, that non-remitters are subject to social sanctions and, second, that
the e¢ cacy of these sanctions decreases in the degree of tribal fractionalization. The rst part
of the argument is widely supported by anthropological and recent economic studies. Migrants
are expected to remit and those who do not face sanctions upon returning to their village, for
example by being denied access to land or access to burial grounds (Gugler, 1968; Connell et
al., 1976; Bates, 1976, 1990, 1999; Collier and Gunning, 1999) or by receiving a reduced or no
inheritance (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Bernheim et al. (1985), La Ferrara, 2007); while the exact
sanctions used can di¤er between regions and among tribes, inheritance and access to family
burial grounds was mentioned repeatedly in the group discussions as the primary instrument
available to families for controlling migrantsbehavior. We model such measures or sanctions
as being applied without cost, which is a good approximation to the situation in rural East
Africa, where disputes are often over burial rights or access to land and sanctions are relatively
low-cost actions. Further, as is well known from the experimental literature, people readily
apply sanctions in e.g. public goods games even if dispensing such sanctions are costly to
them.
The second assumption also has support from a wide range of studies. Bates and Shepsle
(1997) investigate the impact of ostracism on non-contributers to public goods in games featur-
ing overlapping generations, and argue that such ostracism functions better within than across
ethnic groups. In a similar way, Bates (1999) argues that identity generally, and ethnicity
specically, serves to facilitate benecial economic interactions that would otherwise not have
taken place and he argues that it is precisely the ability of clans or tribes to levy and uphold
social sanctions that sometimes makes ethnicity a creative force in sub-Saharan Africa. Miguel
and Gugerty (2005) and Miguel (2004) present empirical evidence from East Africa that more
tribally fractionalized communities are less able to secure voluntary payments for local public
goods, and they attribute this to the fact that social sanctions function less e¤ectively across
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tribal groups.11
More direct evidence comes from Miguel and Posner (2006) who, based on cross-country
evidence, suggest that ethnic salience is higher in more homogenous places. If this is true
also within countries, it conrms why ethnic homogeneity is important for facilitating social
sanctions: if tribal or ethnic salience is low in heterogenous places, upholding norms and social
sanctions related to remittances is di¢ cult, while tribal a¢ liations are very much a part of
daily lives in homogenous places. In a similar spirit, Ross and Weisner (1977) argue that
the strength of networks in the sending community a¤ects the scope for sanctions. Recent
experimental evidence also supports the idea that the detrimental e¤ect of ethnic diversity
on public goods provision is through a lack of shared social norms and an inability to carry
out social sanctions. Habyarimana et al. (2007) experimentally test competing explanations
for the lack of success in providing public goods in heterogenous groups. They carry out
the test in a heterogenous community in Kampala, and nd no support for preference-based
and team-work explanations, but conclude that ethnically homogenous communities possess
both norms and networks that facilitate the sanctioning of community members who fail to
contribute to collective endeavors.(Habyarimana et al. 2007, p. 722). Further, they nd that
players cooperate more under the threat of sanctioning, that enforcers punish players when
enforcement is costly, that they punish defecting co-ethnics more than defecting non-co-ethnics
and that this is particularly true when a co-ethnic defects in a game with another co-ethnic.
This supports our assumption that villagers of another tribe are less likely to participate in the
sanctioning of a non-remitter.
Finally, this assumption is also supported in our own data, to which we return in more detail
below: Survey evidence from 69 villages reveals that a village-level average of trust in family
membersis negatively correlated with tribal fractionalization, as is a village-level average of
trust in fellow tribesmen.12 This supports our measure of lack of cooperation potential, the
validity of which could be weakened if intragroup relations strengthen as inter-group di¤erences
become more pronounced.
11 In formal models of these issues, the relation between ethnicity and punishment strategies in the forms of
social sanctions is rarely modelled directly but rather assumed, as we do below. In a related setting, however,
La Ferrara (2003) considers a microfounded model of credit in a dynastic environment, where punishments
for failure to repay loans are levied on dynastic descendants, endogenously making repayment an equilibrium
response.
12p-values for the correlations are :006 and :154; respectively. Data from the SCPS, described in the section
on data below. We also nd unity of the village, spirit of participation in the villageand group functioning
to be signicantly negatively correlated with tribal fractionalization across the 69 villages, ndings which are
conrmed in our group interviews where participants generally agreed that villages with one tribe (homogenous
villages) had better cooperation than mixed tribe villages, and that villages with good cooperation were generally
thought to be better able to sit down and discussappropriate measures to be taken against non-remitters (eld
notes, cluster 19).
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3.1 The model
The household lives for two periods, 1 and 2, and receives exogenous income A in each period.
The household H has a life time utility function, with a concave Bernoulli utility function v
over income. The household has a representative child, and we model the choice of schooling
as a continuous variable b 2 [0; 1] ; where b = 1 is full time schooling, for example through to a
completed secondary school degree, and b = 0 implies no schooling.13 The costs of education,
and subsequent migration, including uniform costs, school fees and relocation expenses, are
denoted e: Schooling increases the chance of getting a formal sector job. Denote by p (b) the
probability of getting a formal sector job as a function of human capital accumulation; we
assume that the probability of becoming employed depends positively on the level of schooling
such that p0 > 0: Child labor yields a wage wT per e¢ ciency unit. This wage is normalized to
one.
The household wishes to maximize expected lifetime utility, subject to the costs of educating
children and subject to the determination of the level of remittances taking place in the second
period. Hence, the households maximization problem is
max
b0
v (A+ (1  b)  be) + Ev (A;R; b) (1)
Ev (A;R; b) = p (b) v (A+R) + (1  p (b)) v (A)
where R is the level of remittances determined by the migrant in the second period.
In the second period, the migrant M gets a formal sector job, with wages wH ; with prob-
ability p (b) ; or an informal sector job, with wages wL < wH ; with probability 1   p (b) : If
he gets a formal sector job or other employment with high wages, he is expected to remit a
part of his earnings to the household. If he does not obtain a high income, he is not expected
to remit. We model this in the following simple way: Expected sanctions are a function of
remittances R  0 and carry a utility cost to the migrant, denoted    R R ; where  (0) = 0
(if remittances equal R);  0 > 0: This is the rst assumption referred to above. However,
in practice the ability of the rural community to sit down and discuss appropriate measures
depends in part on the civil society of the rural village. We model this by including the term
q (TF ) ; where q is the probability that such measures are implemented and q0 < 0 captures
that this probability decreases in the degree of tribal fractionalization; hence, with probability
1   q measures are not implemented and utility cost is zero, and if no measures are taken,
expected utility cost is zero. This is the second assumption referred to above.
13We abstract from the households choice of education for the group of children; modelling this empirically
using a count data model yields similar results. In practice, there is wide variation in the years of completed
schooling. In the Kagera data, migrant children report years of completed schooling and there is positive support
for the full range of school years from 1 to 11.
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Based on this, the migrant solves
max
R0
p (b)

u
 
wH  R  q (TF )   R R+ (1  p (b))u  wL
In that case, the rst order condition14 for an interior solution R becomes
u0
 
wH  R = q (TF ) 0   R R if R > 0 (2)
and for the corner
u0
 
wH

> q (TF ) 0
 
R

if R = 0: (3)
The rst order condition implicitly denes optimal remittances R as a function of tribal
fractionalization, TF: Knowing the level of remittances in the second period given a high wage
income, parents now solve (1) : We assume that there is an interior solution to this problem,
characterized by the rst order condition15
v0 (A+ 1  b (1 + e)) (1 + e) = p0 (b) [v (A+R)  v (A)] : (4)
We can now determine the e¤ect of the communitys ability to sanction non-remitters, charac-
terized by the tribal fractionalization of the village, on the amount on schooling as
db
dTF
=
db
dR
dR
dTF
: (5)
Straightforward di¤erentiation of (2) and (4) yields16
db
dR
> 0 and
dR
dTF
< 0
14The second order condition for a maximum is
u00

wH  R

  q (TF ) 00   R R < 0
which is satised if  00 > 0 or not too negative. We assume this to be the case.
15Again, the second order condition for a maximum is that v00 (A+ 1  b (1 + e)) (1 + e)2 +
p00 (b) [v (A+R)  v (A)] < 0 which is the case for example if p00  0.
16The expressions are, respectively,
db
dR
=
 p0 (b) v0 (A+R)
v00 (A+ 1  b (1 + e)) (1 + e)2 + p00 (b) [v (A+R)  v (A)] > 0
and
dR
dTF
=
 q0 (TF ) 0   R R
u00 (wH  R)  q (TF ) 00   R R < 0:
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which yields
db
dTF
=
db
dR
dR
dTF
< 0: (6)
Thus, increasing tribal fractionalization decreases the risk of being sanctioned by the commu-
nity, which decreases remittances sent. Households, recognizing this, respond by spending less
on education in the rst period. If R = 0 in the corner solution, there is no return on the
investment b and, in the absence of altruism and schooling laws, the optimal choice of b is
zero.17
In sum, this simple model predicts a reduced form causal relationship between village level
tribal fractionalization and schooling decisions. However, as noted in the introduction, there
exists a number of potential explanations that could account for such an empirical relationship
between tribal fractionalization and schooling. To discriminate between these competing expla-
nations, we utilize the additional structure provided by the model in the decomposition (5) to
test the hypothesis that the causal relation from tribal fractionalization to schooling is based on
the intergenerational contract, whereby social norms and the scope for social sanctions govern
payment of remittances, which in turn inuences the households decision to invest in schooling
in the rst place. We defer the investigation of alternative explanations to section six, below.
4 Data
We employ several data sets from Tanzania to investigate the hypothesis that tribal fractional-
ization a¤ects schooling decisions, and that it does so through the intergenerational contract.
This section describes the quantitative data, which consists of several large-scale household
surveys.
4.1 Quantitative data sources
Our main sources of data are two large-scale household data sets from Tanzania, both collected
in the early 1990s. One is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of 5184 households
from 1993-94, the Human Resource Development Survey (HRDS); the other is a detailed re-
gional four wave panel survey of over 800 households in 51 clusters, the Kagera Health and
Development Survey (KHDS), carried out in the Kagera region of Northwestern Tanzania from
1991-1994 at six month intervals.18 ;19 Both data sets sample rural households with school-aged
17Compulsory schooling laws were considerably strengthened in Tanzania in the late 1990s, after the period
from which our data stems. Our group interviews conrm much more widespread education than 10 years before.
18Both data sets are collected by the World Bank as Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). They
can be downloaded from http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/
19Kagera borders on Rwanda and experienced a large inow of Rwandan refugees following the 1994 genocide
(see Center for the Study of Forced Migration, 2003). Our village-level measures are based on the rst wave of
the survey, carried out in 1991-92, and are not a¤ected by the mid-1990s refugee situation in Tanzania.
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children, but only the KHDS includes information on migrant children. We use the HRDS data
set whenever feasible, as it is both a much larger data set and nationally representative.
Our main empirical investigation is based on the HRDS, and this data set also allows us
to test three out of four alternative explanations referred to in the introduction. However,
when investigating our hypothesized causal path, that the negative e¤ect of TF on schooling
stem from lower levels of remittances and weaker intergenerational contracts between migrant
children and their parents, we have to use the more detailed regional survey as well as our
qualitative data, both from Kagera. In the KHDS, extraordinary care was devoted to collecting
data on children of the household living elsewhere. This includes their geographical location,
level of education, employment status and, not least, their level of remittances. This is unusual
for household surveys, which typically collects information only on current household members.
Finally, we also make use of a third data set, the Social Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS)
collected in 1994-95 in most of the rural HRDS clusters.20 It is therefore possible to merge
HRDS and SCPS data at the village level, although the households surveyed are not identical.
We use the SCPS data for analyzing and testing some of our alternative explanations.
4.1.1 Sampling
The sampling in the HRDS is based on the sampling frame of the National Master Sample
collected by the Tanzanian Bureau of Statistics. It uses all the 222 clusters of the National
Master Sample, 100 of which are rural villages while 122 are enumeration areas in urban
settings. Within each cluster, 20-25 households were sampled at random, see Ferreira and
Gri¢ n (1996).
KHDS was originally collected to measure the impact of adult mortality and morbidity
on the welfare of individuals and households. Kagera was chosen mainly because it was the
epicenter of the East African AIDS epidemic. The sampling of KHDS therefore focused on
oversampling households with high probability of adult mortality. This resulted in a two-stage
stratied random sample, where the stratication was done over agronomic zones at the cluster
level and over joint morbidity and mortality status at the household level. This resulted in
51 clusters of 16 households in each, out of which 14 households were characterized as sick
and 2 households as wellduring the enumeration. Such a heavy stratication calls for careful
consideration in any estimation analysis. However, if the stratication is based on variables
exogenous to the question of interest, it can be ignored in the sense that any M-estimator will
produce consistent estimates and allow for valid inference (Wooldridge, 2002). We test for
di¤erences in results between welland sickhouseholds when using the KHDS data and nd
no e¤ects.
20SCPS was also collected by the World Bank, but not as part of the LSMS set-up.
15
4.1.2 Tribal fractionalization measure
We measure the strength of informal institutions by the degree of tribal fractionalization. We
focus on tribal a¢ liation rather than clan membership, as we have no data on the latter and
recognizing, with Horowitz (1985, p.60), that [t]here is no bright line to be drawn between
kinship and ethnicity, especially in societies where the range of recognized family relationships
is wide and the importance of kinship ties is great. For a village k; the value of the tribal
fractionalization index TF is given by
TFk = 1 
X
h2Hk
2hk
where hk is the population share of tribe h in village k; and Hk is a partition of tribes in village
k such that the tribal shares sum to one in each village. The tribal shares hk are village level
estimates based on individual household responses in HRDS; while the empirical analysis below
concentrates on households with school age children, the estimates of the tribal shares are based
on the entire, substantially larger, HRDS sample. Figure 1 shows the distribution of villages
with respect to the fractionalization measure, both in total and for rural and urban areas
separately.
< Figure 1 here >
In the empirical specication below, we follow the recommendation by Vigdor (2002) by
including also tribal population shares on their own. Excluding tribal shares would imply the
behavioral restriction that all tribes have the same propensity to invest in education, regardless
of the tribal composition of their village. It could be the case that some tribes, possible for
reasons of tradition or degree of modernization, are more prone to investing in formal education,
and we capture this by including the individual shares.21 As we note below, the individual
tribal shares are jointly strongly signicant, also if we include the TF index.
5 Empirical specication and identication
The simple model above yields several testable empirical predictions, two of which stem directly
from the rst order conditions for schooling (4) and for remittances (2), respectively. These
rst order conditions can be directly translated into reduced form regressions.
Empirically, we model the households choice of education based on (4) as a binary variable,
which equals one if a school-aged child is enrolled in or has completed primary school, zero
21Some tribes have more traditions for migration, a necessary part of education paying o¤ (Connell et al. 1976,
ch. 2) while there are also di¤erences between tribes in their propensity to carry out punishments (McElreath,
2004).
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otherwise.22 The reduced form is estimated as a standard logit model, where a child is enrolled
if the optimal b from equation (4) is greater than or equal to the equivalent of seven years of
primary schooling, b. We know from the rst order condition that b can be characterized as a
function of direct and indirect schooling costs, household income in period 1 and period 2, the
urban employment probability function and tribal fractionalization through future remittances.
To the extent possible, these variables, or their close proxies, are included in the regression
model, along with a range of control variables, X; which have been found to a¤ect the choice
of schooling or might control for some of the unobserved future variables. Our main estimating
equation, the schooling regression, is given by
prob(b  b) = (0 + 1e+ 2wT + 3A1 + 4TF + X): (7)
Based on the model, our hypothesis is that 4 < 0: The estimation of (7) is based on a
sample of all children of household heads between 7-17 years of age23 drawn from the Tanzania-
wide HRDS data set. Households base their schooling decision on their expectations about
future remittances. This implies that there are two underlying conditions which must hold for
the schooling rst order condition, and thus the reduced form regression above, to be valid.
First, an underlying assumption of the model is that the probability of formal employment
must be increasing in b, i.e. p0(b) > 0: Second, the degree of tribal fractionalization must have
a negative e¤ect on remittances, dRdTF < 0: Both of these conditions relate to second period
variables for the migrant child. These are necessary, but not su¢ cient, conditions to identify
the model. To investigate these second period relations, we turn to the KHDS data with its
detailed information about migrant children.
We investigate the assumption that p0(b) > 0 by simply regressing the probability of formal
employment on the level of schooling of the migrant along with controls for age, gender, and
geographical location, W. We focus on formal employment which guarantees the migrant a
monthly wage as the distinction between unemployment and self-employment (e.g. as petty-
trader) or informal jobs is often very blurred in developing countries. We nd this to be the
case  primary schooling increases the chances for formal sector employment in a strongly
signicant way, as does secondary schooling.24
The second condition which must be satised for our main regression to be a valid reduced
form of the model relates remittances to the degree of tribal fractionalization; the migrants
22School enrolment reects the long run decision of the parents, whereas recent school attendance is subject
to temporary uctuations in household resources. Enrolment is also preferred over school attainment to ensure
a reasonable link between schooling decisions and current income levels.
23Since school enrolment is often delayed, we widen the o¢ cial school age with two years from 7-17 rather
than 7-17 years. We are not including foster children, or other children not directly related to the household
head, as their intergenerational contracts will be di¤erent. The sample is drawn from the Tanzania-wide data
set, HRDS. Results are replicated using the KHDS data with the same sample selection.
24Results are enclosed as table A.3.
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rst order condition (2) implies that dRdTF < 0: This translates into a regression of the level
of remittances on employment status, and the probability that sanctions for non-remitting
migrants are invoked, which depends on the time invariant variable TF . We estimate this as
a censored (or corner-solution) Tobit model, since we frequently observe remittances equal to
zero. The censored Tobit is set up in terms of a latent variable, where the optimal amount of
remittances for each individual is
Ri = 0 + 1w
H
i + 2TF + Zi+ui;
where Z is a set of control variables, including individual, household and village characteristics.
The model predicts that 1 > 0 and that 2 < 0: A necessary identication condition of the
model is thus that we do not reject 2 < 0. In principle, Ri can be negative if the migrant
would like to receive remittances from the family, but since this is not the migrants decision
to make and we do not observe such wishes, Ri is censored at the corner solution zero; in the
data, we observe Ri = max(0; Ri ). The conditional expectation of R given our explanatory
variables is then a composite measure of the probability of remitting and the expected value
of remittances, given that the migrant child is remitting.
E(RjwH ; TF;Z) = prob(R > 0jwH ; TF;Z)E(RjwH ; TF;Z;R > 0) (8)
We will primarily model the level of remittances as a Tobit model, which assumes homo-
geneity and normality about the error term ui for the -estimates to be consistent. To get
additional insights into the nature of remittances, we use a hurdle model, which is a decom-
position that essentially corresponds to a joint result of a probit model of the probability of
remitting and a linear regression of the conditional expectation of the level of remittances in
the uncensored part of the sample.
5.1 Identication
In the regression analysis below, we estimate investment in schooling and payment of remit-
tances on tribal fractionalization. For the resulting estimates to be interpreted as causal e¤ects,
we need to consider identication of the empirical model. First, the tribal fractionalization of
a village could be endogenous to school quality or variables related to this. Second, estimates
of 4 in (7) could represent e¤ects of other slow-moving village level variables on schooling and
remittances rather than TF having an e¤ect of its own.
Regarding the rst concern, we can rely on the historical fact that there has been relatively
stable tribal settlement patterns in rural Tanzania since the mid-1970s. Most villages in rural
Tanzania were established well before colonial rule ended, and from the mid-1970s up to the
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early 1990s, which is when the surveys that we employ were collected, mobility was limited
in Tanzania, though not non-existent, as has been the case in neighboring Kenya (see Miguel,
2003). The villagization program, Ujamaa, carried out in the mid-1970s, forced some rural
residents to move to other, often newly constructed, villages and in the following period rural
mobility has been severely restricted, to have increased only recently. This, in itself, suggests
that migration into rural communities, which are the focus of our investigation, has been
limited.
This is conrmed by data from the SCPS, where respondents were asked to rate whether
they perceived migration into their community as high. We code a village to have high frequency
of migration if more than a third of the respondents in the village think so. Even with this
generous denition, only nine percent of villages were classied as having a high frequency
of migration. There is no signicant di¤erence in the migration pattern across more and less
heterogenous villages, and excluding the high frequency villages from the analysis below does
not change results, see bottom panel of table 1 below.
Regarding the second concern, which is also related to possible alternative explanations
to which we return in section seven, we include a wide range of village level controls in the
estimating equations. As a more direct and transparent preliminary investigation, in table 1
we compare the most homogenous quintile of HRDS/SCPS villages with the most heterogenous
quintile across a number of variables that could be related to tribal fractionalization. Corre-
lations across the full sample yields similar results, but the comparison in table 1 facilitates
interpretation. The table reports mean values for the characteristics for the two groups of
villages, as well as the di¤erence and the resulting t-test values.
< Table 1 here >
The table suggests a well-balanced sample for household expenditure and hectares of land
owned with respect to tribal homogeneity, but household size (and thus fertility) is signicantly
higher in low TF villages. As for our alternative explanations, there is also support for some
of these. There is no direct evidence that perceived school quality is consistently higher in
low fractionalization villages, nor are there any signicant di¤erences in term of schooling
expenditure or school distance between high and low TF villages. Only among school supplies
do we nd a very marginal di¤erence in favour of low TF villages. This is as expected and
found by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) for Kenya. There is more support for the informal credit
and land scarcity explanations. In low TF villages, 21 per cent of the households report that
if they faced a sudden credit need of approximately 100 USD, then they would rst ask their
family, friends or relatives for assistance, as opposed to pawn shops, local traders, banks or
credit cooperatives. This is almost 10 percentage points higher than in high TF villages and
the one sided t-test is also clearly signicant with a p-value of 0.04. Likewise, 43 per cent of
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households in low TF villages report that land is very di¢ cult to obtain (although there is no
signicant di¤erence in number of ha of land owned), and 26 per cent of households that it
is mainly acquired through inheritance.25 These numbers are also signicantly higher than in
low TF villages. This shows the importance of also testing the signicance of these di¤erent
variables in the schooling regression along with TF. Including these variables as controls will
ensure that their e¤ects on schooling are captured separately from any e¤ect of TF.
6 Results
6.1 Schooling, informal institutions and tribal fractionalization
The results from the estimation of the relationship between school enrollment and tribal frac-
tionalization (equation (7)) is shown in table two, with standard errors corrected for clustering
at the village level in parentheses. Model 1 includes a constant, the tribal fractionalization
index, TF, and controls for the tribal population shares at the village level. This simple model
shows that there is a signicantly negative e¤ect of TF on the probability of a child being
enrolled in school; model 2 adds regional controls, which does not a¤ect the estimated e¤ect
of TF ; in any case, the magnitude of this estimated e¤ect is likely to be biased due to omitted
variables.26
Model 3 includes a set of key explanatory variables, some originating from the theoretical
discussion above, some being standard controls in the literature on school enrolment. These
include the household expenditure level as a measure of the households resources,27 and mea-
sures of direct and opportunity costs of schooling. The latter are present if a household owns
land, has direct agricultural income, or has a herd, in which case the need for (possibly, part
time) child labor is higher, increasing the opportunity cost of educating children formally.28
Additionally, distance to school matters as children who spend more time travelling to school
are less available for part-time work, such as fetching water or caring for younger siblings. Fur-
thermore, we include prospects of non-agricultural employment (measured by the proportion
of the adult village population in formal or informal employment).
25As several group discussants noted, parents have an obligation to give their children either a shamba (a plot
of land) or an education (and sometimes both). If land is scarce, the only possiblity for giving your children a
piece of land is by subdividing your own shamba, which would show up in the data as a smaller average shamba
size.
26The corresponding summary statistics are shown in Table A1 in the appendix
27The e¤ect of household incomes on the child labor vs. schooling choice is not unambiguous. See Baland and
Robinson (2000) and Rogers and Swinnerton (2004).
28Land and herd ownership can inuence the choice of education in other ways as well. As noted by Lucas
and Stark (1985), households with inheritable assets receive more remittances. In our framework, household
assets can be used in the bargaining over remittances to increase the ow of funds from migrants to parents,
increasing the expected return on schooling.
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< Table 2 here >
Finally, model 4 includes school quality indicator variables to control for the e¤ects identied
by Miguel and Gugerty (2004) that ethnically diverse communities in Kenya are less successful
in securing voluntary contributions for funding primary schools, which could conceivably a¤ect
perceived quality of such schools. In our case, however, including school quality variables a¤ects
the estimated e¤ect of TF only marginally, echoing the small di¤erences across homogenous
and heterogenous villages observed in table 1.
The estimated coe¢ cients on tribal fractionalization are reasonably stable across the speci-
cations, and the TF coe¢ cient is negative and signicant at the 5 % level throughout. Based
on model 4 in table 2, the marginal e¤ect of increasing tribal fractionalization equals  0:23;
thus, increasing tribal fractionalization by one standard deviation (.26 in our sample) lowers
the probability of being in school by 6 percentage points. The remaining explanatory variables
all have the expected sign, but a few are insignicant. The level of household expenditures has
a positive signicant impact on the schooling decision, but it is reduced when the main income
source is agricultural and children thus are needed for help; a similar conclusion comes from
the negative e¤ect of the household having a herd. Furthermore, girls are enrolled in school
more often than are boys, while a greater distance to school, measured as the average at the
cluster level, decreases school enrollment.
Table 3 shows results divided by gender. The e¤ect of TF on schooling is larger for girls
than for boys, as there is more variation in the schooling of girls, but both estimated e¤ects
are signicant and sizeable. Additionally, we see that it is the education of girls that drives
the result on income. The education of girls thus seem to be somewhat more of a luxury
decision, made when there are funds for it. This is conrmed by the group interviews, where the
education of boys is always preferred over the education of girls, partly because the education of
girls is perceived to be associated with more risk for two reasons: rst, girls might get pregnant
when attending school (especially secondary school) and subsequently drop out; second, once
married, the obligations of a woman lie primarily with her husbands family and not her own.
Her parents can therefore not expect or demand assistance from her, but only hope for it.
< Table 3 here >
As for the marginal e¤ects of TF on the schooling probability of girls and boys, the e¤ects
remain signicantly negative and of the same order of magnitude; the probability of school
attendance of girls is reduced by almost 25 percentage points and of boys by 20 percentage
points when moving from a complete homogenous village to a heterogenous village. The results
are thus robust to choice of specication.
The result that increasing tribal fractionalization decreases the probability of school en-
rollment is the rst step in showing how informal institutions inuence the intergenerational
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contract. We now turn to the second step, examining in more detail the more specic partial
derivatives predicted by the decomposition of the reduced form relationship.
6.2 Remittances and tribal fractionalization
Out of the 714 rural households observed in the rst wave of KHDS, 76% of all households
received remittances within the past 12 months of the interview, and 52% of all households have
received remittances from Children Living Elsewhere (CLE), i.e. individuals about whom we
have additional information such as educational background and economic activity. There is a
signicant positive di¤erence between remittances sent from children with primary education or
more and children without education, conrming that households are rational when expecting
remittances to increase with education; we return to this below.
We also nd that there are signicant positive di¤erences in the proportion of households
receiving remittances in low TF villages compared to high TF villages; this is the case both for
all remittances received and for remittances from children. In the most homogenous villages, the
average proportion of households receiving remittances is 76%, and 53% of households receive
remittances from their children, compared to average proportions of 69% receiving from anyone
and 47% receiving from children in the most heterogenous villages. This is supportive of our
second assumption, and is conrmed in the regression analysis below.
For the regression analysis, we focus on the migrants decision to remit to a household in
his or her village of origin. For sample migrants who live within the region of Kagera, 12 %
(n = 1309) remitted in the past six months of the survey, while for migrants living outside
of Kagera, 22 % (n = 554) remitted. However, migrants living nearby often assist families
in various ways beyond, or instead of, monetary remittances, types of assistance which are
substitutes for monetary transfers, but not captured by the survey used here. Thus, including
nearby migrants with faraway migrants can bias results related to monetary remittances. As
a consequence, we focus on the sample of migrants outside of Kagera, as they do not have
the opportunity of providing in-kind assistance to the same extent. At the same time, there
is ample evidence that migrants, and in particular migrants to faraway towns, are a selective
sample (Stark, 1991). While we do control for available individual characteristics, it remains
likely that migrants leaving Kagera are di¤erent from those staying put on a number of, possibly
unobservable, dimensions. This provides another reason for focusing on the sample of migrants
outside of Kagera.
Table 4 relates the payment of remittances by migrants to characteristics of the individ-
ual CLE, the recipient household, and the village of the recipient household, see equation (8)
above29. As noted in the introduction, most of the economic literature on remittances has fo-
29The corresponding summary statistics are shown in table A2 in the appendix.
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cused on sender and recipient characteristics, while some work in demography has also included
a limited selection of village-level characteristics.30 We base our choice of control variables on
the standard of the remittances literature (see, e.g., Vanwey, 2004), but include also additional
village level characteristics that can be thought to inuence the intergenerational contract,
including various inheritance rules and traditions.
< Table 4 here >
In the sample of migrant children living outside Kagera, 78 % choose the corner solution
of no remittances in the rst wave (equation (3) above). This number increases in subsequent
waves due to the very short time span of six months between each wave. The censoring means
that OLS estimation will produce inconsistent estimates, but the OLS results reported in table
1, model 1, nevertheless provide a benchmark for more complex models, and, furthermore,
assists us in assessing the appropriateness of subsequent specications below. For now, we
simply observe that the negative estimated e¤ect of TF is statistically signicant.
In reality, remittances are either positive (interior solutions) or zero in the corner solution.
Model 4.2 present results from a Tobit model, which allows for corner solutions in a natural
way. In this specication, the estimate on TF is negative and strongly signicant, consistent
with parents in more heterogenous villages expecting remittances to be lower. The overall e¤ect
is not big: Increasing TF from the minimum to the maximum in the sample, 0 to .66, increases
the (latent variable) amount paid by 1100 shillings, the equivalent of USD 2.40; note, however,
that this is the amount sent within the last six months, meaning of course that the total return
is much larger. The low magnitude of the (latent variable) estimate reects the substantial
mass point at zero. If we look at the two marginal e¤ects separately, we nd that the marginal
e¤ect conditional on paying is indeed quite small, while the e¤ect of TF on the probability of
receiving a positive amount (which can be calculated from the probit model, described below),
as compared to zero, is reasonably large; increasing TF from 0 to .66 decreases the probability
of observing positive remittances by 8 percentage points.
The results on controls are also of interest. First, we note that having a formal sector job
and completed primary or secondary education strongly increases the probability of sending
remittances. We obviously encounter the problem that TF can have inuenced schooling in the
rst place, as demonstrated above, but our estimate of the direct e¤ect is not greatly a¤ected
by the in- or exclusion of the schooling variables. The main e¤ect of excluding the schooling
variables is that TF becomes signicant at the 1% level.
In addition, girls remit more than boys (but see below), and households with more land
receive more remittances. Households in communities with mutual aid among farmers, possibly
30Denoted contextual e¤ects in the demography literature, such village level characteristics often include
history of migration or village level measures of economic conditions.
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representing higher social capital or cooperation in general, receive more remittances. This is
consistent with remittances being sent not to alleviate household idiosyncratic income shocks,
but rather to be in good standing with the community. The same interpretation can be applied
to the result that households in communities that have experienced inheritance disputes in the
past year receive higher remittances: if inheritance rules are not fully agreed upon, it can
be important to maintain a good relationship with the household (see also Lucas and Stark,
1985). Overall, remittance patterns di¤er somewhat between tribes, and in general remittances
decrease from the rst wave to the subsequent three, reecting that in the rst wave respondents
were asked about receiving remittances in the past 12 months, while subsequent waves asked
about remittances in the past six months.
6.3 Robustness
In model 3, table 4, we model the sending of remittances as a binary decision, equal to one
if remittances are sent and zero otherwise. We estimate this using a probit model; again, TF
enters in a negative and statistically signicant way. This specication also allows us to assess
the appropriateness of the Tobit-model. Under the assumption of normality,   = where 
is the coe¢ cient on TF in the probit specication,  the corresponding coe¢ cient in the tobit
specication and  the standard error of the tobit (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, p. 521). Using
the estimation counterparts, we nd that ^ =  :98 and that ^=^ =  10:48=11:10 =  :94;
which does not suggest misspecication of the tobit model. As another check, we note that
the share of observations with positive remittances (= :13) multiplied by the tobit estimate on
TF ( 10:48) yields  1:36 which is quite close to the OLS estimate of  1:07, as should be the
case under assumptions of joint normality under censoring from below at zero (Wooldridge,
2002).31
In model 4, table 4, we estimate an OLS model conditional on remittances being positive.
The size of the estimated coe¢ cient is roughly as in model 4.1, but the standard error somewhat
larger as the number of observations has dropped by almost a factor of 10. Models 4.3 (probit)
and 4.4 (OLS conditional on sending) together approximate a hurdle model, which allows for
the e¤ects of the explanatory variables to di¤er between the qualitative choice of choosing no or
positive remittances, and the quantitative choice of choosing the amount of remittances.32 We
nd that TF a¤ects negatively both the decision to send remittances at all and the decision on
how much to send, conditional on sending, which accords well with the corner solution structure
of the model; the estimated coe¢ cients suggest, as discussed above, that the quantitatively
31Additional specication checks for heteroscedasticity were carried out based on the probit model. We found
little evidence of heteroscedasticity, and in the few case where some was present, notably primary education and
formal sector jobs, it did not a¤ect results.
32Alternatively, we could have modelled the continuous sending decision by a truncated regression model; this
strengthens results on TF somewhat, but have no other e¤ects.
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important e¤ect is on sending vs. non-sending rather than on the amount sent. While the
smaller sample of the conditional OLS model requires careful comparisons, some variables are
seen to a¤ect the decisions whether to send and how much to send in di¤erent ways. In
particular, girls tend to send at a much higher frequency than boys, but they send smaller
amounts; thus, the sign on girls is positive in the binary sending model, while it is negative,
albeit insignicant, in the model of how much to send. While beyond the scope of this paper,
the hurdle model suggests that the factors a¤ecting the act of sending remittances at all, which
signals a willingness to send, can be di¤erent from the factors determining the amount sent.
7 Alternative explanations
A number of alternative explanations for the observed reduced form results exist: First, consider
the role of urban networks. Urban networks can be important by helping arriving migrants
get housing and work, and networks can also monitor migrants and remind them of their
obligations towards those at home. Thus, strong urban networks increase the expected return
on schooling and migration. If the functioning of urban networks is better when they are rooted
in more homogenous villages, stronger urban networks, rather than a higher risk of sanctions,
could explain the observed relationship between TF and schooling. We cannot observe the
number of migrants in a city that come from a particular village, but one direct test for
the inuence of home village tribal fractionalization through urban networks is to model the
probability of getting a formal sector, high paying job as a function of TF directly. While
we nd that schooling dramatically increases the probability of getting a formal sector job,
as discussed above, we nd no signicant direct e¤ects of TF (table A.1). Respondents in
the group discussion were generally sceptical of urban networks acting on behalf of village
households, arguing for example that securing remittances is not an objective of the network,
and that information about individualsbehavior is generally not available [Cluster 2, item 8].
Second, from our group interviews it became clear that ethnically homogenous villages are
often associated with being ancestral villages, where land is scarce, whereas heterogenous vil-
lages could be of more recent and uncertain origin and have a higher degree of land availability.
Therefore, if parents are faced with the choice of either giving their child a plot of land or an
education (cf. note above), the relative cost of providing children with a shamba would be
lower in villages where land is available, which may happen to be where tribal fractionalization
is high. We cannot observe village age in our data, but we do observe individual and average
land holdings. In table 1, we saw that average shamba sizes were approximately equal across
homogenous and heterogenous communities, and we control for household land holdings in
regressions. For the detailed Kagera data, the bivariate relationship is in fact the opposite:
more homogenous villages also have larger land holdings, which would tend toward choosing
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less schooling for the children of the household.33 Table 5 shows results from including into
the main specication additional explanatory variables. While the rst column reproduces our
main choice of specication from table 2, columns 2 and 3 include, respectively, a measure of
limited land availability and an indicator variable for land being mainly inherited. Neither of
these are signicant, and interactions with TF does not suggests any such e¤ects.
< Table 5 here >
Third, living in an tribally homogenous village can increase the probability that a household
hit by a negative shock receives assistance from fellow villagers, as part of an informal insurance
system. At the same time, it can facilitate cooperation on sending children to school or funding
migration for educated children. While a full investigation of the relationship between credit
availability, insurance and tribal fractionalization is beyond the scope of this paper, we do have
some evidence on (the lack of) a relationship between these. From table 1 we see that there are
marginally better informal credit opportunities in the most homogenous villages compared to
the most heterogenous villages, but as seen in model 4, table 5, this result does not carry over
to a regression framework; the e¤ect of informal credit availability is itself insignicant in the
schooling regression, and does not a¤ect the estimated e¤ect of TF.34 Furthermore, we could
not nd evidence to suggest that the e¤ect of TF on schooling depends on the availability of
credit opportunities; interacting TF with household expenditures (our equivalent of A1 in the
model) did not yield any results. As already mentioned, the other part of the intergenerational
contract, the payment of remittances, was not a¤ected by the existence of local insurance
arrangements, measured by the availability of mutual aid among farmers in a village, even if
the latter itself in some specications did appear to be associated with higher remittances.
Finally, tribal fractionalization could be correlated with school quality, as suggested by
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) in the case of Kenya. Better school quality would increase the
demand for schooling, due to an expectation of better schooling outcome and thus urban
labour market prospects. As we noted above, tables 1 and 2 show that school quality does
not appear to be associated with tribal fractionalization and, furthermore, does not a¤ect the
estimate of the e¤ect of TF on school enrolment decisions.
33Gulliver (1961) suggests that rural land scarcity in colonial times provided a catalyst for change of inheritance
rules. Less available land meant that sons had a harder time acquiring land on their own, which led to pressure
on, and in turn change of, past inheritance norms by which brothers were the rst to inherit. In turn, this
created incentives for sons to inuence the division of the inheritance, in part by remaining in good standing
with the home village.
34 In addition, group interview respondents in all villages strongly disagreed with the idea that families would
jointly raise money for funding migration for particular children; this was simply unheard of.
26
8 Discussion
The intergenerational contract has two components: investment in schooling and payment of
pensions. While intergenerational contracts in developed economies are generally managed by
the state, in developing economies with weaker state structures and less scal capacity, in-
tergenerational contracts are generally thought to be enforced by traditions and social norms,
often rooted in tribal or ethnic a¢ liations. The analysis presented in this paper takes a compre-
hensive approach to analyzing intergenerational contracts in developing economies, including
decisions on both schooling and pensions (in the form of remittances), joined together by and
enforced through tribal identity.
Our ndings are at odds with the notion that all traditional institutions are a hindrance
to development. In rural Tanzania, it is exactly traditional institutions that help overcome
enforcement problems inherent to the family bargaining underlying educational choice, migra-
tion, and remittances. If such traditions weaken, and social structures lose some of their power,
the move towards more education and, ultimately, a higher standard of living, could be delayed
or impaired if other institutions do not take their place. Therefore, while informal institutions
would not necessarily be a part of the rst best solution in a fully modernized state, they may
be able to correct, at least partially, distortions arising from underdeveloped credit markets.
insu¢ cient social insurance systems and lack of scal capacity.
At the same time, the interconnection between tribal or ethnic identity and the provision of
schooling and pensions suggests that successful government involvement in, say, basic school-
ing, can have implications for the informal provision of pensions as well as patterns of tribal
a¢ liations. Conversely, policies directed at national identity or unity can have consequences for
the provision of both schooling and pensions. This is important as the weakening of traditional
institutions are sometimes an independent policy initiative of national governments. In Tan-
zania, in particular, there has been consistent e¤orts since the 1960s to create a nation state
to replace tribal communities. While this e¤ort has been successful in many ways (Miguel,
2004), including creating a strong national identity, the results of this paper suggest that tribal
a¢ liation still has implications for the daily lives of Tanzanians, an impression strongly sup-
ported by our group interviews. A main reason for this, of course, is that existing authority
structures such as tribes and elders do not simply sit around and wait for their authority to
be challenged by government strategies aimed at replacing traditional allegiances. As noted
by Bates (1999), in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa the notion that villagers must be buried
in the place they were born is actually quite recent, dating from the 1970s when youth began
to question the eldersauthority and, hence, the reason to remit and stay on good terms with
the rural community. Similarly, Snyder (1997) reports that the continuation of religious rituals
among the Iraqw of northern Tanzania is closely linked to the legitimacy of political authority;
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if the role of the religious ritual is weakened, so is the eldersauthority which involves allocating
land and settling disputes.
We see the results of this paper as a testimony to the fact that ethnicity, and more broadly
identity, can sometimes help create and support important economic transactions which would
otherwise not be realized due to weak formal institutions or underdeveloped markets. The
absence of ethnic a¢ liation would not necessarily imply that more benecial transactions would
be undertaken; rather, as noted by Carr and Landa (1983), or Greif (1993) in the context of
Mediterranean traders in fourteenth century Europe, existence of an ethnic identity can help
sustain exchange where there would otherwise be none.
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Table 1: Di¤erences across homogenous and heterogenous communities
Cluster means Low TF High TF Di¤erence t-test p-value
HRDS variables
Household size 6.47 5.94 .52 1.84 .07
Hhd expenditures per a.e. .80 .89 .09 1.05 .30
Land (ha) 12.21 10.59 1.62 0.91 .37
School expenditures 6.66 5.83 .83 0.67 .51
Distance to school 1.61 1.77 .16 0.57 .57
School quality variables
Teachers good/adequate* .73 .80 .07 1.40 .91
School supplies g/a* .42 .36 .06 0.95 .17
Environment g/a* .54 .50 .04 0.72 .23
Swahili lessons g/a* .83 .90 .07 1.39 .91
English lessons g/a* .56 .63 .07 1.47 .93
Math lessons g/a* .73 .82 .09 1.88 .97
SCPS variables
High migration freq. .06 .10 .04 0.64 .52
Informal credit* .21 .12 .09 1.82 .04
Limited land availability* .43 .22 .21 2.03 .02
Land mainly inherited* .26 .15 .11 2.01 .03
Note: Numbers may not add up due to rounding. Di¤erences and t-test statistics are absolute numbers. The
t-tests have 43 d.f. and are assumed to have equal variances. # clusters in low TF is 23 and in high TF is 22.
*p-values are for one-sided hypothesis testing of better school quality, better informal credit opportunities and
less access to land, respectively, in low TF villages. Sample is based on rural HRDS and SCPS clusters.
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Table 2: School enrolment and tribal fractionalization
School logits (1) (2) (3) (4)
TF -0.641*** -0.688** -0.848** -0.777**
(0.238) (0.282) (0.343) (0.339)
Age 2.018*** 2.029***
(0.140) (0.140)
Age^2 -0.069*** -0.070***
(0.006) (0.006)
Birth order -0.050 -0.043
(0.036) (0.036)
Girl 0.261*** 0.262***
(0.085) (0.086)
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 1.083*** 1.144***
(0.412) (0.427)
Agriculture is main income 0.239 0.235
(0.320) (0.331)
HH exp*Agricultural income -0.771* -0.805*
(0.448) (0.461)
School expenditure, cluster av. 0.000 -0.007
(0.027) (0.027)
School distance, cluster av. -0.237*** -0.238***
(0.087) (0.088)
Household has herd -0.332*** -0.345***
(0.104) (0.107)
Total number of children 0.064*** 0.063***
(0.022) (0.022)
Land (ha) 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.007)
Land^2 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Tribal population shares no yes*** yes*** yes***
Region controls no yes yes** yes**
School quality controls no no no yes*
Observations 3826 3826 3826 3826
Pseudo R-squared 0.005 0.019 0.285 0.288
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at the village level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results on included constant term not reported.
Table 3: School enrolment and tribal fractionalization by gender
School logits (1) (2) (3)
All Girls Boys
TF -0.776** -0.893** -0.702**
(0.339) (0.413) (0.357)
Age 2.029*** 1.931*** 2.162***
(0.140) (0.207) (0.178)
Age^2 -0.070*** -0.066*** -0.075***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Birth order -0.038 -0.049 -0.022
(0.036) (0.047) (0.047)
Girl 0.263***
(0.086)
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 1.144*** 1.254*** 1.147*
(0.427) (0.481) (0.646)
Agriculture is main income 0.235 0.020 0.522
(0.331) (0.366) (0.545)
HH exp*Agricultural income -0.805* -0.911* -0.828
(0.461) (0.526) (0.708)
School expenditure, cluster av. -0.007 -0.003 -0.010
(0.027) (0.036) (0.026)
School distance, cluster av. -0.238*** -0.256** -0.213**
(0.088) (0.117) (0.092)
Household has herd -0.346*** -0.442*** -0.270*
(0.107) (0.164) (0.138)
Total number of children 0.061*** 0.064* 0.055**
(0.022) (0.035) (0.026)
Land (ha) 0.009 0.015* 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Land^2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -12.443*** -11.227*** -13.695***
(0.947) (1.228) (1.269)
Tribal population shares yes*** yes*** yes***
Region controls yes** yes yes***
School quality controls yes* yes yes*
Observations 3826 1895 1931
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.286 0.298
Results on included constant term not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Remittances and tribal fractionalization
1 2 3 4
OLS Tobit Probit OLS
log(remit) log(remit) remit n/y log(remit)
TF -1.07** -10.48** -0.98** -1.11
(0.49) (5.17) (0.47) (0.68)
Formal sector job 1.15*** 5.73*** 0.54*** 0.25*
(0.17) (0.89) (0.09) (0.14)
Completed primary school 0.48*** 7.41*** 0.67*** 0.19
(0.13) (1.32) (0.12) (0.14)
Completed secondary school 1.04*** 8.38*** 0.76*** 0.48***
(0.34) (1.55) (0.16) (0.16)
Girl 0.36** 3.27*** 0.31*** -0.18
(0.14) (0.94) (0.09) (0.15)
Age 0.08*** 1.04*** 0.09*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.23) (0.02) (0.06)
Age^2 -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(mean) hhsize -0.02* -0.07 -0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02)
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) -0.08* -0.89 -0.09 0.14
(0.05) (0.55) (0.06) (0.14)
Agriculture is main income -0.04 0.98 0.11 -0.68**
(0.13) (0.86) (0.09) (0.27)
Log(Land (ha)) 0.20** 1.56*** 0.15*** 0.11
(0.08) (0.57) (0.06) (0.10)
Household has herd -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01)
Mutual aid among farmers 0.18 1.56* 0.14 0.02
(0.12) (0.89) (0.09) (0.16)
Community population size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inheritance disputes past 12m 0.22* 1.32* 0.13* -0.01
(0.11) (0.76) (0.07) (0.18)
Can wife inherit land 0.16 1.24 0.11 0.10
(0.12) (0.75) (0.07) (0.15)
Funeral arranged by family or clan -0.24* -1.70* -0.16* -0.04
(0.14) (0.97) (0.09) (0.13)
Tribe of HH head§ 0.000 0.015 0.008 0.087
Village level tribal shares§ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Religion§ 0.499 0.394 0.315 0.219
Survey wave§ 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.350
sigma^hat 11.10***
(0.32)
Sample Full Full Full remit > 0
Observations 2875 2875 2852 346
R-squared 0.161 0.116 0.219 0.290
No. of clusters 40 40 40 39
log likelihood -1843.0 -822.9
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at village level in parentheses.
A constant was included but is not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
§ Reports p-values for F-tests that all variables within category are zero.
Table 5: Alternative explanations
School logits, HRDS sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
TF -0.776** -0.781** -0.786** -0.765**
(0.339) (0.339) (0.341) (0.351)
Limited land availability -0.186
(0.242)
Land mainly inherited -0.357
(0.600)
Member of major tribe in cluster 0.015
(0.157)
Informal credit
Tribal population shares yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Region controls yes** yes** yes** yes**
School quality controls yes* yes* yes* yes*
Observations 3826 3826 3826 3826
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288
Regressions included additional control variables as in table 2, model 4: Age, Age^2, Birth-order, Gender, 
 HH expenditure, agriculture income, school expenditure, school distance, herd, no. of children
 land holdings, interaction terms and a constant.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A1. Summary statistics for HRDS sample
Variable Mean SD Min Max
TF 0.345 0.264 0.000 0.903
Age 11.558 3.142 7.000 17.000
Birth order 2.366 1.954 0.000 16.000
Girl 0.495 0.500 0.000 1.000
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 0.724 0.490 0.054 5.213
Daily HH expenditure per AE, squared 0.764 1.630 0.003 27.177
Agriculture is main income 0.893 0.309 0.000 1.000
HH exp*Agricultural income 0.637 0.495 0.000 4.863
School expenditure, cluster av. 6.118 3.413 1.718 19.281
School distance, cluster av. 1.471 0.989 0.185 5.417
Household has herd 0.386 0.487 0.000 1.000
Total number of children 5.068 2.856 0.000 19.000
Land (ha) 15.203 17.916 0.000 190.000
Adequate/good teachers 0.747 0.435 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good headmaster 0.814 0.389 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good school supplies 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good environment 0.549 0.498 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good self-reliance 0.774 0.418 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good Swahili 0.865 0.342 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good English 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good mathematics 0.768 0.422 0.000 1.000
Adequate/good moral classes 0.724 0.447 0.000 1.000
Limited land availability 0.324 0.355 0.000 1.000
Land mainly inherited 0.205 0.178 0.000 0.733
Informal credit 0.183 0.172 0.000 0.600
Member of major tribe in cluster 0.777 0.416 0.000 1.000
Observations 3826
Data source: HRDS
mean sd min max
Log(remittances) 0.969 2.655 0.000 12.553
TF 0.172 0.198 0.000 0.660
Formal sector job 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000
Completed primary school 0.379 0.485 0.000 1.000
Completed secondary school 0.153 0.360 0.000 1.000
Girl 0.330 0.470 0.000 1.000
Age 28.741 9.354 15.000 68.000
HH size 8.398 4.841 1.000 36.000
Mutual aid among farmers 0.722 0.448 0.000 1.000
Daily HH expenditure per AE ($) 0.439 0.682 0.000 9.023
Agriculture is main income 0.793 0.405 0.000 1.000
Log(Land (ha)) 0.669 0.772 -2.109 4.123
Household has herd 1.929 6.733 0.000 94.000
Community population size 3195.621 3078.783 525.000 18526.000
Catholic 0.552 0.497 0.000 1.000
Muslim 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
Protestant 0.183 0.387 0.000 1.000
Inheritance disputes past 12m 0.558 0.497 0.000 1.000
Can wife inherit land 0.357 0.479 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mhaya in village 0.665 0.396 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mnyambo in village 0.090 0.255 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mhangaza in village 0.095 0.274 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Msubi in village 0.022 0.088 0.000 0.500
Proportion of Mzinza in village 0.007 0.024 0.000 0.150
Proportion of Other tribes in village 0.163 0.292 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Kishubi in village 0.015 0.041 0.000 0.222
Funeral arranged by family or clan 0.703 0.457 0.000 1.000
Observations 2875
Table A2. Summary statistics KHDS sample
Table A.3. The effect of education on formal sector employment.
1 2 3
Some primary school 0.461* 0.480** 0.394
(0.243) (0.243) (0.257)
Completed primary school 1.185*** 1.196*** 1.074***
(0.267) (0.266) (0.287)
Completed secondary school 2.288*** 2.295*** 2.129***
(0.293) (0.293) (0.330)
Age 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.270***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056)
Age^2 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Girl -0.680*** -0.681*** -0.726***
(0.144) (0.145) (0.148)
TF -0.236 0.012
(0.463) (0.600)
Village level tribal shares No No Yes
Survey wave Yes Yes Yes
Place of residence Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations 2723 2723 2723
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant included, but results not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Data source: KHDS
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Figure 1: Tribal fractionalization in rural and urban clusters
